State v. Diehl Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 40044 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
12-26-2013
State v. Diehl Respondent's Brief Dckt. 40044
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Diehl Respondent's Brief Dckt. 40044" (2013). Not Reported. 953.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/953
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDA 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) OPY 
) No. 40044 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
) Clark Co. Case No. 
vs. ) CR-2011-17 
) 




BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF CLARK 
HONORABLEJOELE.TINGEY 
District Judge 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
JOHN C. McKINNEY 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 




SPENCER J. HAHN 
Deputy State Appellate 
Public Defender 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................. ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 1 
Nature Of The Case .............................................................................. 1 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings ................... 1 
ISSUES ............................................................................................................ 4 
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................... 5 
Diehl Has Failed To Show Any Error In The District Court's 
Denial Of His Rule 35 Motion For Correction Of An Illegal 
Sentence ............................................................................................... 5 
A. lntroduction ................................................................................. 5 
B. Standard Of Review ................................................................... 5 
C. Diehl Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial 
Of His Rule 35 Motion ................................................................ 6 
CONCLUSION ..... : ......................................................................................... 14 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ......................................................................... 14 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
Belknap v. State, 98 Idaho 690,571 P.2d 336 (1977) ................................................... 12 
Bojorquez v. State, 135 Idaho 758, 24 P.3d 706 (Ct. App. 2000) .................................. 10 
Ex parte Medley, 73 Idaho 474, 253 P.2d 794 (1953) ..................................................... 9 
State v. Alvarado, 132 Idaho 248, 970 P .2d 516 (Ct. App. 1998) .................................. 10 
State v. Bell, 119 Idaho 1015, 812 P.2d 322 (Ct. App. 1991) ........................................ 12 
State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho 308, 1 P.3d 809 (Ct. App. 2000) ........................................ 13 
State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 218 P.3d 1143 (2009) ................................................. 6 
State v. Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138, 30 P.3d 293 (2001) ................................................. 12 
State v. Denny, 122 Idaho 563, 835 P.2d 1374 (Ct. App. 1992) .................................... 12 
State v. Ditmars, 98 Idaho 472,567 P.2d 17 (1977) ................................................ 10, 12 
State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 170 P.3d 397 (2007) ................................................ 6, 7 
State v. Fox, 122 Idaho 550, 835 P.2d 1361 (Ct. App. 1992) .......................................... 6 
State v. Goodlett, 139 Idaho 262, 77 P.3d 487 (2003) .............................................. 8, 12 
State v. Hancock, 111 Idaho 835, 727 P.2d 1263 (Ct. App. 1986) .................................. 9 
State v. Law, 131 Idaho 90, 952 P.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1998) .............................................. 8 
State v. Lundquist, 122 Idaho 190, 832 P.2d 761 (Ct. App. 1992) ................................. 10 
State v. McCoy, 128 Idaho 362, 913 P.2d 578 (1996) ..................................................... 7 
State v. Omey, 112 Idaho 930, 736 P.2d 1384 (Ct. App. 1987) ..................................... 11 
State v. Salsgiver, 112 Idaho 933, 736 P.2d 1387 (Ct. App. 1987) ............................... 11 
State v. Smith, 130 Idaho 450,942 P.2d 574 (Ct. App. 1997) ................................... 8, 12 
ii 
State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 104 P.3d 969 (2005) .................................................... 11 
State v. Sutton, 113 Idaho 832, 748 P.2d 416 (Ct. App. 1987) .................................... 6, 8 
Statev. White, 107 Idaho 941,694 P.2d 890 (1985) ............................................... 11, 12 
State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 923 P.2d 966 (1996) ..................................................... 9 
STATUTES 
I. C. § 18-112 .................................................................................................................... 7 
I. C. § 18-7001 .................................................................................................................. 7 
I.C. § 19-2503 ........................................................................................................ passim 
I.C. § 19-2521 ................................................................................................................ 11 
I.C. § 19-2601 ........................................................................................................ passim 
I.C. § 49-1404 .................................................................................................................. 7 
RULES 
I.C.R. 35 .................................................................................................................. 5, 6, 8 
1.C.R. 43 ........................................................................................................ 5, 10, 11, 13 
iii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Bruce L. Diehl appeals from the district court's order denying his Rule 35 motion 
for correction of an illegal sentence. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Diehl was charged with felony eluding a police officer and felony malicious injury 
to property (R., pp.21-24), 1 and following trial, a jury convicted him of both offenses (R., 
pp.44-46). At the sentencing hearing, Diehl told the district court that rather than being 
placed in the retained jurisdiction program, "[y]ou might as well send me to do my time, 
Your Honor." (Tr., p.318, Ls.12-22.) The district court advised Diehl that, once he got 
to the retained jurisdiction ("rider") program, he was free to decide whether he wanted to 
participate in that program and advise the Department of Correction if he did not. (Tr., 
p.318, L.23 - p.319, L.25.) The district court sentenced Diehl to four years with one and 
one-half years fixed for felony eluding a police officer, and four years with two years 
fixed for felony malicious injury to property, and retained jurisdiction for up to one year. 
(R., pp.70-74.) Diehl filed a timely notice of appeal from his judgment of conviction. (R., 
pp.79-80.) The record does not indicate that, once Diehl went on his rider, he ever 
1 Two Clerk's Records have been provided to the state on appeal. The shorter of the 
two records has 129 numbered pages, and was made in the normal course of Diehl's 
appeal from his judgment of conviction. The larger Clerk's Record has 200 numbered 
pages, and was prepared after Diehl's Rule 35 motion was denied. All references to the 
record refer to the larger of the two Clerk's Records. It should be noted that the larger 
Clerk's Record contains ten misnumbered pages. The first pages numbered 91 through 
100 appear to have been stricken by a large red "X" on page 91. After the first page 
numbered 100, the numbering resumes as page 91, and continues in correct sequence. 
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informed the Idaho Department of Correction that he preferred prison time to probation. 
At the end of his rider, the Department recommended that the district court place Diehl 
on probation, which it did on February 9, 2012. (R., pp.81-89, 183.) 
On April 12, 2013, a Report of Probation Violation was filed alleging Diehl (1) had 
been in possession of drug paraphernalia and alcohol, tested positive for 
methamphetamine, and admitted using marijuana, methamphetamine, and a synthetic 
cannabinoid called "spice"; (2) associated with a known felon; (3) failed to report to his 
probation officer; (4) possessed multiple firearms and ammunition; and (5) was 
unsuccessfully discharged from his drug aftercare treatment group. (R., pp.91-100.) 
Diehl was arrested on a bench warrant on April 16, 2012, and the district court 
appointed counsel to represent him. (R., pp.101, 108-109.) 
Diehl filed a pro se Motion for Correction of Illegal Sentence, based on Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35(a), which he later amended, claiming his sentence is illegal because, 
inter a/ia, he was not present when the district court placed him on probation following 
his rider. (R., pp.118-122, 124-127, 133-137.) At a hearing on August 13, 2012, Diehl 
argued his Motion for Correction of Illegal Sentence on his own behalf. (R., pp.180-181; 
8/13/12 Tr., p.326, L.7 - p.329, L.18.) On August 23, 2012, the district court issued an 
Order on Motions, denying Diehl's Motion for Correction of Illegal Sentence and 
concluding that Diehl's presence when he was placed on probation was not legally 
2 
mandated.2 (R., pp.182-185.) Diehl filed a timely appeal from that order. (R., pp.193-
197.) 
2 That same date, the state filed a Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice the Report of 
Probation Violation filed previously "for the reason that there is currently a federal 
indictment for Mr. Diehl's arrest" (R., pp.188-189), which was granted (R., pp.190-191). 
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ISSUES 
Diehl states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court violate Idaho law and Mr. Diehl's constitutional 
rights to due process and to be free from unreasonable search and 
seizures when it placed him on probation in absentia and without 
consent? 
2. Assuming, arguendo, that Mr. Diehl could be placed on probation in 
absentia and without his consent, can conditions of probation be 
imposed on him in absentia and without his consent? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.3.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
Has Diehl failed to show any error in the district court's denial of his Rule 35 
motion for correction of an illegal sentence? 
4 
ARGUMENT 
Diehl Has Failed To Show Any Error In The District Court's Denial Of His Rule 35 
Motion For Correction Of An Illegal Sentence 
A. Introduction 
Diehl challenges the district court's denial of his Rule 35 motion to correct an 
illegal sentence. Diehl argues that the district court violated Idaho law (I.C. § 19-2503 
and I.C.R. 43) and his constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable search and 
seizures by placing him on probation in absentia and without his consent. (Appellant's 
Brief, pp.4-8.) Diehl also contends that, even if he could be placed on probation in 
absentia and without his consent, "[b]ecause [he] did not consent to any conditions of 
probation, they must be declared void ab initio, with his probation converted to one for 
which there are no conditions." (Id., p.8.) 
Diehl's arguments fail because ( 1) the district court's order of probation following 
his retained jurisdiction does not constitute an illegal sentence under I.C.R. 35(a), and 
(2) even if construed as a motion "to correct a sentence that has been imposed in an 
illegal manner" pursuant to I.C.R. 35(b), Diehl's motion cannot be reviewed by this Court 
because it was filed more than 120 days from the entry of the order placing him on 
probation. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"'Generally, whether a sentence is illegal or whether it was imposed in an illegal 
manner is a question of law, over which [the appellate court] exercise[s] free review."' 
5 
State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 84, 218 P.3d 1143, 1145 (2009) (quoting State v. 
Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 735, 170 P.3d 397,400 (2007). 
C. Diehl Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Rule 35 Motion 
Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35(a) a district court "may correct a sentence 
that is illegal from the face of the record at any time." However, under I.C.R. 35(b), a 
motion to reduce a sentence, or correct a sentence that was imposed in an illegal 
manner, "must be filed within 120 days of the entry of the judgment imposing sentence 
or order releasing retained jurisdiction .... " Because these filing limitations are 
jurisdictional, the district court lacks jurisdiction to grant any motion requesting relief that 
is filed after the time limit proscribed by the rule. State v. Sutton, 113 Idaho 832, 748 
P.2d 416 (Ct. App. 1987); State v. Fox, 122 Idaho 550, 835 P.2d 1361 (Ct. App. 1992) 
('The filing deadlines described in [Rule 35] create a jurisdictional limitation on the 
authority of the trial court to entertain motions under the rule. Without a timely filing, the 
court cannot consider the motion." (internal citations omitted)). Diehl's Motion for 
Correction of Illegal Sentence (R., pp.124- 127) was filed more than 120 days after both 
his Judgment of Conviction (R., pp.70-74) and Retained Jurisdiction Order of Probation 
(R., pp.81-88) were entered. Therefore, under Rule 35(a), the district court only had 
jurisdiction to consider whether Diehl's sentences were "illegal from the face of the 
record." 
In Clements, 148 Idaho at 86, 218 P.3d at 1147, the Idaho Supreme Court 
explained what constitutes an illegal sentence under Rule 35: 
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[T]he term "illegal sentence" under Rule 35 is narrowly interpreted as a 
sentence that is illegal from the face of the record, i.e., does not involve 
significant questions of fact or require an evidentiary hearing. This 
interpretation is harmonious with current Idaho law. As this Court recently 
noted in State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 735, 170 P.3d 397, 400 (2007), 
Rule 35 is a "narrow rule." Because an illegal sentence may be corrected 
at any time, the authority conferred by Rule 35 should be limited to uphold 
the finality of judgments. Rule 35 is not a vehicle designed to reexamine 
the facts underlying the case to determine whether a sentence is illegal; 
rather, the rule only applies to a narrow category of cases in which the 
sentence imposes a penalty that is simply not authorized by law or where 
new evidence tends to show that the original sentence was excessive. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Diehl's conviction for felony fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer carried 
a maximum penalty of five years imprisonment. I.C. §§ 49-1404; 18-112; see State v. 
McCoy, 128 Idaho 362, 913 P.2d 578 (1996). Diehl's underlying sentence for that crime 
-- a unified four years with one and one-half years fixed (R., pp.70-71) -- was well within 
the sentence authorized by law. The same is true of Diehl's unified four-year sentence 
(with two years fixed) for felony malicious injury to property, which had a maximum 
sentence of five years imprisonment. I.C. § 18-7001(2). The district court's order that 
Diehl be in the retained jurisdiction program for up to 365 days, and its subsequent 
placement of Diehl on probation, were both authorized by I.C. § 19-2601. The district 
court correctly concluded Diehl "was simply placed on probation consistent with the 
Court previously retaining jurisdiction. In view of the crimes for which [Diehl] was 
convicted, [he] has failed to show how the sentences for those crimes were illegal." (R., 
pp.183-184.) There is nothing about Diehl's sentences to suggest they were illegal from 
the face of the record, or that they were unauthorized by law. 
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If Diehl's Rule 35 motion is construed as having alleged, pursuant to I.C.R. 35(b), 
that his sentences -- specifically, being placed on probation and the terms and 
conditions of probation -- were imposed in an illegal manner, the district court lacked 
jurisdiction because Diehl filed his Rule 35 motion on June 20, 2012 (see R., pp.124-
127), two weeks after the expiration of the 120-day period to file such a motion from the 
February 9, 2012 entry of the Retained Jurisdiction Order of Probation (see R., pp.81-
88). Sutton, 113 Idaho 832, 748 P.2d 41. 
Even if this Court considers the merits of Diehl's arguments, he has failed to 
show any error -- statutory, criminal rule, or constitutional -- in the district court's order 
placing him on probation and requiring him to comply with the terms and conditions of 
probation set forth in that order. (See R., pp.81-88.) Idaho appellate courts have 
repeatedly held that no hearing is required before the district court relinquishes 
jurisdiction pursuant to I.C. § 19-2601. State v. Law, 131 Idaho 90, 952 P.2d 905 (Ct. 
App. 1998); State v. Smith, 130 Idaho 450, 942 P.2d 574 (Ct. App. 1997). State v. 
Goodlett, 139 Idaho 262, 77 P.3d 487 (2003) (no due process rights have been created 
by I.C. § 19-2601, which means there is no right to a hearing). Having no right to a 
hearing on the district court's decision whether to relinquish jurisdiction or place him on 
probation, Diehl did not have any right to be present when that decision was made. 
Moreover, I.C. § 19-2601(4) states, "Placement on probation shall be under such 
terms and conditions as the court deems necessary and expedient. . . . Probation is a 
matter left to the sound discretion of the court." In the absence of any right to a hearing 
or to be present when the probation decision was made, and given the discretion 
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granted the district court, Diehl has failed to show any illegality or abuse of discretion in 
the district court's order placing him on probation pursuant to the terms and conditions 
set forth in the order of probation.3 Even if Diehl had the right to take positive steps to 
refuse probation and its terms and conditions (see Appellant's Brief, p.5), he has not 
shown that after he received (or became aware of) the district court's probation order, 
he did anything to inform the court he was rejecting probation. (See Appellant's Brief, 
p.5.) Not only has Diehl failed to show that he took any overt steps to reject probation 
and its terms, he has failed to provide any authority to support the notion that a court 
can order probation terms only if the defendant expressly agrees to such terms in court 
-- vis-a-vis saying nothing but accepting release. See State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 
263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) ("A party waives an issue cited on appeal if either 
authority or argument is lacking, not just if both are lacking."). Therefore, Diehl has 
failed to show that the court-ordered probationary terms and conditions did not fully 
apply to him.4 
Diehl argues that his sentences were illegally modified when he was placed on 
probation without his presence (and without his consent), contrary to I.C. § 19-2503 and 
3 It is well established that the terms and conditions of probation must be contained in a 
written order granting probation. State v. Hancock, 111 Idaho 835, 837, 727 P.2d 1263, 
1265 (Ct. App. 1986) (citing Ex parte Medley, 73 Idaho 474, 480, 253 P.2d 794, 797 
(1953)). The district court's Retained Jurisdiction Order of Probation included the terms 
and conditions of probation, although they do not appear to have been signed by Diehl. 
(See R., pp.81-88.) 
4 Inasmuch as the terms and conditions of Diehl's probation are valid, his request to 
remand this case so the district court can declare his conditions of probation void ab 
initio and give him "a hearing at which he can either accept or decline probation and its 
attendant conditions" (Appellant's Brief, p.10), must be rejected. 
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1.C.R. 43. Diehl is incorrect. I.C. § 19-2503 says, "For the purpose of judgment, if the 
conviction is for a felony, the defendant must be personally present; if for a 
misdemeanor, judgment may be pronounced in his absence." l.C.R. 43(a) requires the 
presence of a defendant "at the arraignment, at the time of the plea, at every stage of 
the trial ... and at the imposition of sentence, except as otherwise provided by this 
rule." (Emphasis added.) The district court rejected Diehl's argument, stating: 
Defendant also argues that the Court "modified the sentence" 
without Defendant's presence after Defendant completed the retained 
jurisdiction program. As the record reflects, at the time of sentencing the 
Court retained jurisdiction to consider probation at a later date. The Court 
thereafter received the report (APSI) from the Department of Corrections 
wherein it was recommended that the Court consider probation. The 
Court thereafter placed Defendant on probation. Contrary to Defendant's 
argument, there was no modification of the sentence. Defendant was 
simply placed on probation consistent with the Court previously retaining 
jurisdiction. In view of the crimes for which Defendant was convicted, 
Defendant has failed to show how the sentences for those crimes were 
illegal. 
(R., pp.183-184) 
The district court correctly concluded that placing Diehl on probation following his 
successful rider did not constitute a "modification of the sentence" (i.e., "imposition" of 
sentence) which would have necessitated Diehl's presence at a hearing. (Id.) As 
explained in Bojorquez v. State, 135 Idaho 758, 761, 24 P.3d 706, 709 (Ct. App. 2000): 
[T]here is an important distinction between the "imposition of a sentence" 
which requires the presence of the defendant and later actions by the trial 
court which affect the sentence after its imposition. Idaho appellate courts 
have long adhered to the principle that a sentence is imposed when 
initially pronounced even if its execution is later postponed when the trial 
court suspends the sentence or retains jurisdiction pursuant to I.C. § 19-
2601(4). See State v. Ditmars, 98 Idaho 472, 474, 567 P.2d 17, 19 
(1977); State v. Alvarado, 132 Idaho 248, 249, 970 P.2d 516, 517 (Ct. 
App. 1998); State v. Lundquist, 122 Idaho 190, 192, 832 P.2d 761, 763 
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(Ct. App. 1992); State v. Omey, 112 Idaho 930, 932, 736 P .2d 1384, 1386 
(Ct. App. 1987); State v. Salsgiver, 112 Idaho 933, 934, 736 P.2d 1387, 
1388 (Ct. App. 1987). 
See also State v. White, 107 Idaho 941, 694 P.2d 890 (1985) (refusing to overrule 
Ditmars). 
Unlike the imposition of sentence, probation is the suspension of such a 
sentence, and the defendant need not be present when probation is ordered for 
probation to be valid. See I.C. § 19-2601(2); State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 931-32, 
104 P.3d 969, 973-74 (2005) (implicitly holding that probation is not a part of the 
sentence because "[t]here is nothing in I.C. § 19-2521 that extends the maximum 
penalty for [the defendant's] crime."). Therefore, Diehl's sentence was imposed on 
October 3, 2011, when the district court pronounced its underlying sentences and 
retained jurisdiction. By placing Diehl on probation following his rider, the district court 
merely suspended execution of his previously imposed sentences; consequently, his 
presence and/or consent were not required before he was placed on probation subject 
to the terms and conditions of probation. Diehl's claim that the district court's probation 
order was illegal because it violated either Idaho Code § 19-2503 or I.C.R. 43, or 
constituted an abuse of discretion, fails. 
Finally, Diehl has failed to show that any of his constitutional due process rights 
were violated by the district court making its probation decision outside his presence. 
Idaho Code § 19-2601 did not create a protectable liberty interest in the district court's 
decision whether to relinquish jurisdiction, and Diehl was not entitled to a hearing, much 
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less to be present at a hearing, when that decision was made. As explained in State v. 
Denny, 122 Idaho 563,835 P.2d 1374 (Ct. App. 1992): 
According to the authority of State v. Ditmars, 98 Idaho 472, 474, 567 
P.2d 17, 19 (1977), cert. denied434 U.S. 1088, 98 S.Ct. 1284, 55 L.Ed.2d 
793 (1978), a defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing when the 
district court relinquishes jurisdiction after a period of retained jurisdiction. 
See also State v. White, 107 Idaho 941, 694 P.2d 890 (1985) (refusing to 
overrule Ditmars). As stated in Ditmars, it is at the pronouncement of 
sentence where the defendant is accorded the constitutional protections 
that Denny seeks. Ditmars, 98 Idaho at 474, 567 P.2d at 19; State v. Bell, 
119 Idaho 1015, 1017, 812 P.2d 322,324 (Ct. App. 1991). A termination 
of retained jurisdiction is neither an imposition of sentence nor a 
revocation of a probation and, in that regard, no hearing is required. Bell, 
119 Idaho at 1017, 812 P.2d at 324 (citing Belknap v. State, 98 Idaho 690, 
571 P.2d 336 (1977)). Thus, a hearing before the trial court is not 
required as a condition precedent to that court's relinquishing its retained 
jurisdiction under I.C. § 19-2601 (4). 
Denny, 122 Idaho at 564, 835 P .2d at 1375. 
Idaho appellate courts have repeatedly held that no hearing is required before 
the district court relinquishes jurisdiction pursuant to l.C. § 19-2601. Law, 131 Idaho 90, 
952 P.2d 905; Smith, 130 Idaho 450, 942 P.2d 574. In Goodlett, 139 Idaho at 264, 77 
P.3d at 489, the Idaho Court of Appeals explained that in State v. Coassolo, 136 Idaho 
138, 30 P.3d 293 (2001 ), the Idaho Supreme Court held "that an inmate's hope or 
expectation of probation at the conclusion of the retained jurisdiction period was not a 
liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause," and, therefore, "there exists no 
constitutional requirement of a hearing either at the correctional facility or in the trial 
court before the court determines whether to relinquish jurisdiction or to place the 
defendant on probation." Inasmuch as defendant's have no due process right to a 
hearing when a district court makes a probation decision following retained jurisdiction, 
12 
there cannot be any due process right for them to be present when such a 
determination is made. 
Diehl has failed to show that, because he did not expressly agree the terms and 
conditions of his court-ordered probation, he was not subject to them. By retaining 
jurisdiction pursuant to I.C. § 19-2601, the court merely suspended the execution of 
Diehl's already imposed sentence for the specified period of retained jurisdiction. At the 
termination of that period, the district court's retained jurisdiction was not revoked but 
merely expired, therefore, Diehl's presence and consent was not required by I.C. § 19-
2503 or I.C.R. 43 when the court made its probation decision.5 Because no liberty 
interest was created by the statute authorizing the district court to retain jurisdiction, 
none of Diehl's due process rights were violated when the court made its probation 
decision outside his presence. Accordingly, Diehl has failed to demonstrate any abuse 
of discretion in the district court's denial of his Motion for Correction of Illegal Sentence. 
5 Inherent in Diehl's argument that the district court's probation decision was illegal 
because it was made outside his presence and without his consent is that he did not, 
and does not now, consent to probation. Inasmuch as Diehl's entire argument is based 
on his rejection of probation, the only available remedy appears to be to vacate the 
probation order and execute the sentence of imprisonment. In addition, it is clear that 
not all sentence modifications, as opposed to initial sentencings, require the presence of 
the defendant. See State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho 308, 315, 1 P.3d 809, 816 (Ct. App. 
2000) (modifying Chavez's sentence for escape to a consecutive one-year determinate 
term of imprisonment.) 
13 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order 
denying Diehl's Motion for Correction of Illegal Sentence. 
DATED this 25th day of December, 2013. 
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